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MALONE v. BRINCAT: THE FIDUCIARY DISCLOSURE
DUTY OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS UNDER
DELAWARE LAW
Nicole M. Kim
Abstract: In Malone v. Brincat, the Supreme Court of Delaware significantly broadened the
fiduciary disclosure duty of corporate directors under Delaware law. Malone allows
shareholders to bring either a direct or a derivative action against directors for the public
release of misleading financial statements reported to the Securities Exchange Commission,
regardless of whether the alleged misstatements were made in connection with a request for
shareholder action. The court also held that a federal preemption statute, the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, did not preempt the shareholders' action in
Delaware state court. This Note argues that the Supreme Court of Delaware failed to provide
precise limits to its new disclosure rule and thereby rendered unclear the elements of the cause
of action by which directors may now be accountable for a breach of the disclosure duty. In
addition, the court's erroneous grant of a direct cause of action creates problematic overlaps
between state and federal causes of action regarding corporate disclosures, particularly in light
of the new federal preemption statute. In conclusion, this Note argues that Malone ultimately
contributes little to the understanding of the fiduciary disclosure duty and unnecessarily
disrupts the balance between state and federal regulation of corporate disclosures.
For the past twenty years, Delaware state courts' have imposed
disclosure duties upon corporate directors based on the directors'
fiduciary relationship to the corporation and its shareholders.2 This
fiduciary duty has been characterized as an obligation that is a
"derivative of the [directors'] duties of care and loyalty,"3 and its
application significantly affects the way directors disseminate corporate
information to shareholders. In Malone v. Brincat,4 the Supreme Court of
Delaware held that corporate directors were liable to shareholders for
reporting inaccurate financial statements to the Securities Exchange
Commission even though no shareholder action required the release of
1. Many corporations incorporate in Delaware because of its numerous "pro-business" statutes
and a judiciary that has been known to give favorable treatment to corporations. Therefore, changes
in Delaware's corporate law may have a significant impact on a corporation incorporated in
Delaware, even if it conducts business elsewhere. For a general discussion of the prominence of the
Delaware Court of Chancery, see William H. Rehnquist, The Prominence of the Delaware Court of
Chancery in the State-Federal Joint Venture ofProvidingJustice, 48 Bus. Law. 351 (1992).
2. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling off the Lynch Mob: The Corporate Director's Fiduciary
Disclosure Duty, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 1087, 1090 (1996).
3. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1166 (Del. 1995); see also Zim v. VLI
Corp., 621 A.2d 773, 778 (Del. 1993) (citing Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983)).
4. 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998).
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the reports.' This decision substantially expanded the fiduciary disclosure
doctrine because the majority of Delaware cases had previously applied
the duty only when directors solicited shareholder action.6 The court
further held that the plaintiffs could bring either a direct or derivative
action against the directors for the misdisclosures and noted that the
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act7 preserved the plaintiffs'
action in Delaware state court.'
This Note argues that the Supreme Court of Delaware insufficiently
explained why a substantial extension of corporate directors' liability
was appropriate, particularly in view of recent federal changes in
securities fraud litigation. As a result, the court's opinion muddled the
precise scope of the disclosure duty and failed to clarify the nature of the
cause of action by which directors may now be liable for violating their
fiduciary duty. The opinion also creates overlapping state and federal
causes of action concerning corporate disclosure that can potentially
undermine the congressional objective of limiting securities fraud
litigation exclusively to federal courts.9 The new rule announced in
Malone is cryptic for several reasons. First, the court gave no principled
basis for distinguishing Malone from existing Delaware authority that
limited disclosure obligations to situations in which directors solicited
shareholder action. Second, by allowing a direct action when the
directors' misconduct did not implicate any shareholder rights, the court
altered the traditional circumstances under which directors owe a
disclosure duty directly to shareholders, and in the process the court
created a state equivalent of a federal securities action. Finally, the
opinion rendered unclear the operational effects of the Uniform Act on
fiduciary disclosure suits brought in Delaware state courts.
Part I of this Note summarizes pre-Malone Delaware case law on
director fiduciary disclosure duty. Part II discusses the purpose and scope
of the federal Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 199510 (Reform
Act) and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (Uniform Act).
5. See id. at 14.
6. See infra Part I.
7. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998)
(codified in scattered sections in 15 U.S.C.).
8. See Malone, 722 A.2d at 13.
9. See infra Part H.
10. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified
in scattered sections in 15 U.S.C.).
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Part III describes the facts, procedural history, and reasoning of the
Supreme Court of Delaware's decision in Malone. Part IV argues that the
Malone court (1) failed to clarify the scope of the newly expanded
disclosure duty, (2) erroneously allowed the shareholders to replead their
complaint as a direct action, (3) incorrectly interpreted the provision of
the Uniform Act that preserved the availability of state courts for certain
actions, and (4) created potential conflicts between the application of
state and federal laws concerning corporate misrepresentations. Part V
concludes that Malone convolutes, rather than clarifies, the fiduciary
disclosure duty and creates needless tensions between state and federal
law regarding corporate disclosures.
I. THE FIDUCIARY DISCLOSURE DUTY OWED BY
DIRECTORS TO SHAREHOLDERS
Delaware statutes impose no specific responsibilities on corporate
directors to provide shareholders with financial information other than
the limited disclosures mandated by the provisions related to shareholder
action." However, since the 1980s, Delaware courts have imposed
disclosure duties on corporate directors based on the directors' fiduciary
relationship to the corporation and its shareholders. 2 A review of the
case law reveals a complex and confusing evolution of this judicially
created duty of disclosure. Nevertheless, the cases exhibit an overriding
theme: liability for a breach of the disclosure duty ordinarily arises when
directors, either in response to statutory mandate or the desire to procure
shareholder approval of a contested transaction, seek shareholder action
and fail in that process to provide all material information that reasonable
shareholders would consider significant in exercising their rights in the
corporation. 3 Initially, many uncertainties about the disclosure doctrine
11. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §§ 222(a) (written notice of meeting), 242(b) (notice of charter
amendments), 251(c) (notice of merger), 262(d)(1) (notice of appraisal rights), 271(a) (notice of
meeting to approve sale of assets) (1998).
12. See Hamermesh, supra note 2, at 1090.
13. See Arnold v. Society for Say. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1280-81 (Del. 1994); Stroud v.
Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992); Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278, 281 (Del. 1977);
Loudon v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 21 Del. J. Corp. L. 724, 731-33 (Del. Ch. Feb. 20, 1996);
Herd v. Major Realty Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,772, at 98,717-18 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21,
1990); Raskin v. Birmingham Steel Corp., Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,668, at 98,131-32 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 4, 1990).
14. See infra note 79.
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existed, but one boundary seemed firm-Delaware decisions held
consistently that fiduciary liability does not exist when a request for
shareholder action is absent.' 4
A. Justifications Behind Imposing Disclosure Duties When Directors
Solicit Shareholder Action
Delaware state courts have imposed fiduciary disclosure obligations
on corporate directors in transactions where directors request or counsel
shareholders to vote, sell, or otherwise take action with regard to their
shares. 5 For example, courts have imposed the duty when directors
solicit shareholder votes for the election of directors" or distribute proxy
statements regarding stockholders' rights to undo charter amendments
after implementation. 7 One of the justifications for requiring disclosure
in these contexts is that a request for shareholder action necessarily
affects fundamental shareholder rights in stock ownership, such as voting
rights.'8 In a recent holding emphasizing this point, the Supreme Court of
Delaware held that directors may not deny or interfere with any of the
rights incident to ownership of shares, moving beyond voting rights to
include such rights as the right to compel dividends or the right to
challenge the issuance of stock for a wrongful purpose. 9
A second justification for imposing disclosure obligations when
shareholder rights are affected lies in the nature of the directors'
relationship to shareholders.20 Shareholders often rely on directors'
knowledge and advice about the corporation's affairs when directors ask
shareholders to take action in regard to shares.2' Relying on directors for
15. See supra note 14. However, courts have noted that there is no reason to apply the fiduciary
duty where the transaction recommended by directors could have been effected without shareholder
action. See In re USACafes, L.P. Litig., 600 A.2d 43, 54 (Del. Ch. 1991) (dismissing plaintiffs'
claims because "[n]either plaintiffs nor any class member could have been injured by the alleged
[disclosure] defect as they had neither a right to vote nor a right to dissent and seek appraisal"); see
also Abajian v. Kennedy, 18 Del. J. Corp. L. 179, 191-92 (Del. Ch. Jan. 17, 1992).
16. See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Kerkorian, No. 6394, letter op. at 1-2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16,
1980).
17. See Cavalcade Oil Corp. v. Texas Am. Energy Corp., 9 Del. J. Corp. L. 417, 418-19 (Del. Ch.
May 22, 1984).
18. See Hamennesh, supra note 2, at 1143-46.
19. See Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 91 (Del. 1992) (citing Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.,
285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971)).
20. See Hamermesh, supra note 2, at 1143-44.
21. See id. at 1159.
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accurate information is natural given the directors' responsibilities to
monitor the conduct of the corporation's business for the benefit of
shareholders who have invested in the corporation and to make
recommendations to shareholders regarding certain transactions.O A
disclosure duty ensures that directors, as corporate fiduciaries, do not
manipulate shareholder action to their own benefit by providing false or
misleading information to shareholders.24
Apart from these two justifications, directors' disclosure obligations are
particularly important because under Delaware law, a fully informed
shareholder vote can ratify management misconduct absent fraud.2 Thus,
the fiduciary disclosure duty safeguards shareholders from making
uninformed decisions regarding a transaction that can adversely affect
shareholders' interests in the corporation.26 The case law shows that the
fiduciary disclosure duty, although now a prominent fixture in Delaware
corporate law, evolved from arguably questionable beginnings in an erratic
fashion.
B. Judicial Treatment of the Disclosure Duty in the Context of
Shareholder Action
Most of the Delaware cases discussing a disclosure duty on the part of
directors cite Smith v. Van Gorkom27 as one of the foundations for such a
duty.28 Van Gorkom is best known for its finding that corporate directors
22. See American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and
Recommendations: Proposed Final Draft § 3.01 (1992).
23. Transactions include tender offers to acquire corporation stock, mergers, or charter
amendments. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2 (1999); see also Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §§ 242(b) (charter
amendments), 251(c) (mergers) (1998).
24. See, e.g., Stroud, 606 A.2d at 91 (citing Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439
(Del. 1971)).
25. See id at 82; Bershad v. Curtiss Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 846 (Del. 1987); Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 890 (Del. 1985).
26. See Hamermesh, supra note 2, at 1160.
27. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
28. See, e.g., Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1166 (Del. 1995); Stroud, 606
A.2d at 86-87 (citing Van Gorkom for proposition that directors have fiduciary duty to disclose
material facts that would have notable effect upon stockholder vote); Weinberger v. Rio Grande
Indus., Inc., 519 A.2d 116, 121 (Del. Ch. 1986); Lacos Land Co. v. Arden Group, Inc., 517 A.2d
271,279 (Del. Ch. 1986). Many courts have considered Lynch v. Vickers, 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1977),
as the genesis of Delaware law concerning disclosure obligations. See, e.g., Arnold v. Society for
Say. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1276 (Del. 1994). However, Lynch involved a stock purchase
where a majority shareholder failed to disclose material information in a tender offer to the minority
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breached their fiduciary duty of care in rapidly approving an arm's length
merger.29 In a less prominent part of its analysis negating shareholder
ratification, the court separately identified a fiduciary disclosure duty.3" It
reasoned that because a fully informed shareholder vote would have ratified
director action, the shareholders were entitled to receive accurate proxy
materials regarding the transaction at issue." The court held that because
disclosure had been defective, the shareholders' action in approving the
merger did not ratify the directors' misconduct.32 Although the Van Gorkom
court did not explicitly adopt a fiduciary disclosure duty, the Supreme Court
of Delaware in Cinerama v. Technicolor33 interpreted Van Gorkom as a
duty-to-disclose case.34 Van Gorkom remained the seminal case regarding
directors' disclosure duty in the context of shareholder action until the
Supreme Court of Delaware decided Stroud v. Grace35 in 1992.
In Stroud, the Supreme Court of Delaware reaffirmed the notion that the
fiduciary disclosure duty is necessarily incident to situations where directors
seek shareholder action.36 In that case, the shareholders brought individual
and derivative actions against the board of directors challenging the
accuracy of the disclosures the board made to shareholders in giving notice
of a meeting at which the shareholders were to consider certain amendments
to the corporation's charter and bylaws.3 7 Although the court found that the
shareholders. The directors were liable for being complicit in the majority's breach. See Lynch, 383
A.2d at 279. Properly understood, Lynch represented a rule that required corporate fiduciaries, when
purchasing the corporation's stock, to disclose material information to the selling shareholders. The
case did not create a fiduciary disclosure duty requiting directors in all contexts to disclose
information that might affect the shareholders' decision. See Hamermesh, supra note 2, at 1117.
Therefore, for the purposes of discussing the directors' disclosure duty in the context of shareholder
action, Lynch is an inappropriate starting point.
29. See Hamermesh, supra note 2, at 1124 n.153.
30. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 890-91.
31. See id. at 890-93.
32. See id.
33. 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995).
34. See id. at 1166. The Van Gorkom court also cited Lynch for authority to support its finding of
fiduciary liability. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 890. Lynch, however, is not on point. See supra
note 28.
35. 606 A.2d 75 (Del. 1992).
36. Several cases have cited Stroud as support for the proposition that directors have a fiduciary
disclosure duty when they seek shareholder action. See Arnold v. Society for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650
A.2d 1270, 1277 (Del. 1994); Loudon v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 21 Del. J. Corp. L. 724, 731
(Del. Ch. Feb. 20, 1996); Bragger v. Budacz, No. 13376, 1994 WL 698609, at *5 (Del. Ch. Dec. 7,
1994).
37. See Stroud, 606 A.2d at 78. The shareholders alleged that certain by-law and charter
amendments served no other purpose than to entrench the majority shareholders in control.
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board did not have a duty to disclose information beyond what was required
by the statute," it noted that "directors... are under a fiduciary duty to
disclose... all material information within the board's control when it seeks
shareholder action."'39 Stating that Delaware imposed a disclosure duty when
determining the adequacy of proxy materials,' the court explained that
otherwise, directors may use their "special knowledge to their own
advantage and to the detriment of the stockholders."' 4' Stroud reinforced the
court's interest in using the disclosure duty to protect the integrity of
shareholder rights and interests in a corporation.42 After Stroud, the nature of
shareholders' claims challenging the directors' breach of the disclosure duty
was relatively clear.
C. Elements of the Cause ofAction by Which Directors Are Liable for
Misdisclosures
Delaware law provides shareholders with a direct cause of action for a
breach of the fiduciary disclosure duty.43 Many shareholders' claims alleging
Furthermore, the shareholders advanced these claims despite the fact that the directors did not solicit
any proxies. See id. at 80, 84.
38. The court emphasized that the directors' duty to disclose material information "does not exist
in a vacuum" and must be considered in conjunction with the disclosure requirements of the
Delaware General Corporation Law. ldt at 85-88.
39. Id. at 84.
40. See i. at 86 (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 890 (Del. 1985)).
41. Id. at 87 (internal quotation omitted).
42. See id at 85-87; see also Arnold v. Society for Say. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1277 (Del.
1994) ("The [disclosure] obligation attaches to proxy statements and any other disclosures in
contemplation of stockholder action."). Transactions that fundamentally affect shareholders'
interests in a corporation include tender offers to acquire corporation stock, mergers, voting to
approve or disapprove charter amendments, and voting in directors' elections. See Hamermesh,
supra note 2, at 1144; see also, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §§ 222(a) (written notice of meeting),
242(b) (notice of charter amendments), 251(c) (notice of merger), 262(d)(1) (notice of appraisal
rights), 271(a) (notice of meeting to approve sale of assets) (1998).
43. See In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., Litig., 634 A.2d 319, 326-33 (Del. 1993); Thorpe v. Cerbco,
Inc., 18 Del. J. Corp. L. 1196, 1199 (Del. Ch. Jan. 26, 1993).
44. See Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1273 (class action alleging directors breached their fiduciary
disclosure duty by failing to disclose material facts of merger in proxy statement); Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 858 (Del. 1985) (class action alleging board of directors' proxy statements
in cash-out merger were incomplete in material respects); Williams v. Grier, 13 Del. . Corp. L. 815,
815 (Del. Ch. May 20, 1987) (class action attacking recapitalization of corporation because of
material misdisclosures in proxy statements); Weinberger v. Rio Grande Indus., Inc., 519 A.2d 116,
116-17 (Del. Ch. 1986) (class action alleging directors failed to disclose material information in
Schedule 14d-9 recommendation in connection with proxy solicitation).
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breach of the disclosure duty have been class actions challenging directors'
misstatements in proxy solicitations.' Because the directors' request for
shareholder action invoked the rights incident to share ownership, directors
owe the disclosure duty directly to shareholders, not the corporation."5
Therefore, shareholders have brought direct actions, instead of derivative
actions, against directors who violated shareholder rights.46
To bring a direct action, shareholders must allege more than an injury
resulting from a wrong done to the corporation; instead, they must allege a
wrong involving their contractual rights that existed independently of any
right of the corporation.47 Consequently, most direct shareholder actions
have involved suits where corporate actions deprived the shareholders of
their individual rights to cast fully informed votes regarding various
transactions.48 By contrast, courts have held that claims alleging dilution of
shareholders' stock constituted derivative actions because the claims
consisted entirely of injuries to the corporation and its shareholders as a
class.49
45. See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 662-63 (Del. Ch. 1988) (holding
expansion of board of directors ultimately foreclosed effective shareholder voting and constituted
violation of duty of loyalty directors owed to shareholders).
46. See Jay W. Eisenhofer & Megan D. McIntyre, Causes ofAction Available to Investors Under
Delaware Law in the Wake of Federal Securities Reform: Part I, Insights, Oct. 1996, at 8, 10; see
also Principles of Corporate Governance, supra note 22, § 7.01 (describing actions courts have
characterized as direct actions). A breach of the duty owed by the director to the corporation usually
leads to corporate derivative actions, brought by the shareholders on behalf of the corporation,
against the wrongdoers. See Kramer v. Western Pac. Indus., Inc., 546 A.2d 348, 353 (Del. 1988)
(citing Bokat v. Getty Oil Co., 262 A.2d 246, 249 (Del. 1970)). Derivative actions are appropriate
when the directors' misconduct affects the corporation as a whole, such as a wrongful act that
depletes the corporation's assets. For example, in Kramer, the Supreme Court of Delaware held that
a complaint alleging directorial mismanagement that resulted in the waste of corporate assets,
including the depression of the value of shareholders' stock, constituted a basis for a derivative suit.
See id at 353; see also infra note 49.
47. See Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1213 (Del. 1996).
48. See Tri-Star, 634 A.2d at 330 (finding claim of stock dilution and corresponding reduction in
shareholders' voting power are grounds to assert direct shareholder action); Lipton v. News Int'l,
PLC, 514 A.2d 1075, 1078 (Del. 1986) (stating that shareholders who alleged corporate stock
exchange agreement violated their voting rights by securing for corporation management veto power
over all shareholder actions set forth direct action rather than derivative action); Thorpe v. Cerbco,
Inc., 18 Del. J. Corp. L. 1196, 1200 (Del. Ch. Jan. 26, 1993) (holding breach of fiduciary claims
based on inadequate proxy disclosure are direct rather than derivative actions); Margolies v. Pope &
Talbot, 12 Del. J. Corp. L. 1092, 1103 (Del. Ch. Dec. 23, 1986) (holding plaintiff-shareholders'
claim relating to diminution of voting rights asserts direct action); Seibert v. Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc., 10 Del. J. Corp. L. 645, 656 (Del. Ch. Dec. 5, 1984) (holding plaintiff's claim
alleging proxy violation due to inadequate disclosures is direct action).
49. See Elster v. American Airlines, Inc., 100 A.2d 219, 222 (Del. Ch. 1953); see also Grimes,
673 A.2d at 1213; Bokat v. Getty Oil Co., 262 A.2d 246, 249 (Del. 1970); In re Rexene Corp.
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To remedy directors' violation of the disclosure duty, most shareholder
suits have pursued injunctive relief, rescission of the transaction at issue, or
rescissory damages instead of monetary damages. Examples of injunctions
requested by shareholders include enjoining issuance of a class of stock"
and overturning the re-election of directors." Moreover, the Supreme Court
of Delaware has noted that Shareholders injured by a breach of the disclosure
duty can enjoin a contested transaction where money damages cannot be
adequately assessed against directors because provisions in the certificate of
incorporation shield directors from liability.52
Unlike requests for injunctive relief, courts have been reluctant to grant
monetary damages even though Delaware has a virtual per se rule of
damages for violations of the disclosure duty. 3 Few Delaware cases have
permitted monetary redress. Van Gorkom authorized a post-hoe monetary
damages remedy for the shareholders, but the remedy arose out of the
directors' breach of their duty of care, not their disclosure duty.' In Zirn v.
Shareholders Litig., 17 Del. J. Corp. L. 342, 348 (Del. Ch. May 8, 1991). Derivative suits have
also included shareholder claims seeking to enjoin a corporation from honoring the exercise of
option rights to purchase shares of common stock, see Elster, 100 A.2d at 222, and claims to
cancel the issuance of stock in violation of the legal requirements as to its consideration. See
Bennet v. Breuil Petroleum Corp., 99 A.2d 236, 241 (Del. Ch. 1953). In derivative suits, any
damage recovery returns to the corporation on whose behalf the suit is filed; however, a
shareholder in a derivative suit may recover attorneys' fees if the shareholder's efforts
benefited the corporation as a whole or benefited shareholders as a class. See, e.g., In re
Beatrice Co., Litig., 12 Del. J. Corp. L. 199, 212 (Del. Ch. Apr. 16, 1986).
50. See Lacos Land Co. v. Arden Group, Inc., 517 A.2d 271, 271 (Del. Ch. 1986).
51. See Loudon v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 21 Del. J. Corp. L. 724, 727 (Del. Ch. Feb.
20, 1996). However, the court in Loudon dismissed the shareholder's complaint because the
shareholder failed to identify specific material facts that were wrongfully omitted in the proxy
statement.
52. See Arnold v. Society for Say. Bancorp, Inc., 678 A.2d 533, 542 (Del. 1996).
53. Shareholders may obtain monetary awards without having to show actual loss from the
misrepresentations. See Trl-Star, 634 A.2d at 333; see also Zirn v. VLI Corp., 681 A.2d 1050,
1060-61 (Del. 1996). However, monetary damages may be excluded in the corporation's
certificate of incorporation if the misstatement or omission was a good faith error. See Del.
Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1998); see also Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1286-88. Some
commentators have suggested that the application of a per se damages rule should not extend
to representations made by disinterested directors and should apply only to transactions
involving a director's self-dealing transaction. See, e.g., Hamermesh, supra note 2, at 1171-72
(arguing that because basis for fiduciary liability is analogous to basis for liability in tort of
negligent misrepresentation, notion that proof of pecuniary loss is not required in claim of
breach of fiduciary duty by disinterested directors is "out of step with fundamental fiduciary
principles").
54. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985). The court found that the directors
breached their fiduciary duty to the shareholders by being grossly negligent in approving
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VLI Corp.,55 the Supreme Court of Delaware determined that the
shareholders had provided sufficient proof of their damages claim and
remanded the damages issue for further proceedings. 6 On remand, however,
the Delaware Court of Chancery found no breaches of fiduciary duty and
thus no viability to the shareholders' claims." Despite the judicial aversion
toward awarding monetary relief, there have been instances where courts
have granted such damages. For example, in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,58 the
court on remand awarded the shareholders one dollar per share.59 Evidence
existed that if the shareholders had received complete disclosure and
subsequently rejected the proposed cash-out merger, the majority share-
holder would have acquired the other shareholders' shares at twenty-two
rather than twenty-one dollars per share.' However, the court noted that
while a rescission of the merger may have been a more appropriate remedy,
monetary relief was proper in this instance because the complicated nature
of the merger made it "logically impractical" to rescind the transaction.6
D. Testing the Bounds of the Fiduciary Disclosure Duty: The Court of
Chancery Cases
Although the nature of the fiduciary disclosure duty and the remedies
available for violations of that duty seemed well settled in Delaware
courts after Stroud,62 the court of chancery slowly began to extend the
amendments to the merger proposal and failing to disclose all material information before securing
the shareholders' approval of the merger. See id.
55. 621 A.2d 773 (Del. 1993).
56. See id. at 783.
57. See Zim v. VLI Corp., 20 Del. J. Corp. L. 1155, 1174-75 (Del. Ch. June 12, 1995).
58. 10 Del. J. Corp. L. 945 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 1985), aff'd, 497 A.2d 792 (Del. 1985). Although
UOP addressed the disclosure duty, it discussed the duty as it pertained to a majority shareholder,
not a director.
59. See id. at 960.
60. See id. at 950.
61. Id.
62. Several court of chancery opinions affirmed that fiduciary liability for misrepresentations
existed only when shareholder action was required or sought. See Raskin v. Birmingham Steel Corp.,
Fed. See. L. Rep. (CHH) 95,668, at 98,131-32 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 1990) (rejecting claim that
directors breached fiduciary disclosure duty by failing to notify shareholders about deterioration of
pending merger negotiation because company did not seek vote of shareholders); see also Herd v.
Major Realty Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 95,772, at 98,718 n.2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 1990)
(dismissing claims alleging false press releases and Form 10K because "the duty of candor requires
1160
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application of the disclosure duty to situations where directors did not
solicit shareholder action. In Weinberger v. Rio Grande Industries, Inc.,63
the court of chancery found that the directors' omission of information in
a Schedule 14d-9, 4 filed pursuant to Rule 14d-9 of the federal securities
laws and submitted to shareholders in connection with a tender offer,
may have violated the directors' fiduciary duty to disclose all material
facts in a transaction involving shareholder action.' However, the court
presented no authority or justification to support its finding that directors
may be liable even though they did not request shareholder action but
merely provided information to shareholders as required by federal law."
Furthermore, although the shareholders could have pursued a federal
remedy under § 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for false
disclosures in proxy solicitations,67 the court did not address this
alternative recovery route.
In 1991, the court of chancery expressed concern over the idea that
directors could be less than fully honest with stockholders about the
condition of the company just because the directors did not request
shareholder action.6" One year later, in Marhart, Inc. v. Calmat Co.,69 the
court of chancery had the opportunity not only to speak directly to the
issue, but also to forge a fiduciary disclosure duty beyond the traditional
application in the context of shareholder action.
disclosure of all material facts only in connection with a transaction on which shareholders are asked
to vote") (citing Lynch v. Vickers, 383 A.2d 278, 279 (Del. 1977)).
63. 519 A.2d 116 (Del. Ch. 1986).
64. A company must file a Schedule 14d-9 with the Securities Exchange Commission when an
interested party such as an issuer, a beneficial owner of securities, or a representative of either,
makes a solicitation or recommendation to the shareholders with respect to a tender offer that is
subject to Regulation 14D. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1994).
65. See Rio Grande, 519 A.2d. at 121. The court mentioned Van Gorkom to support the
proposition that under Delaware law, corporate directors have fiduciary disclosure obligations when
they seek shareholder action. See id.
66. See Hamermesh, supra note 2, at 1128.
67. See Rio Grande, 519 A.2d at 120. Because the shareholders tendered their shares in response
to the directors' Schedule 14d-9 recommendation, they were able to bring action under § 14.
68. See In re Rexene Corp., 17 Del. J. Corp. L. 342,351 n.1 (Del. Ch. May 8, 1991). The Rexene
court ultimately did not reach the issue of whether fiduciary liability lay with the directors in the
absence of any request for shareholder action because it found that the alleged nondisclosures were
not material. See id. at 351.
69. 18 Del. . Corp. L. 330 (Del. Ch. Apr. 22, 1992).
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1. The Expansion of the Fiduciary Disclosure Duty
Marhart significantly departed from 'Delaware precedent and set in
motion a series of judicial decisions that struggled to determine the
precise scope of directors' disclosure obligations. In Marhart, Vice
Chancellor Berger held that directors could be liable for a breach of the
fiduciary duty of disclosure even though the misrepresentation was not
connected with any request for shareholder action.7" Marhart involved a
press release issued by the directors, in response to a possible takeover,
that outlined a restructuring plan designed to provide shareholders with a
better cash benefit than that offered by the hostile acquiror.7 The
corporation later publicly announced a modification of the plan that
provided shareholders with half of what they would have received under
the original plan." An institutional shareholder brought a class action
alleging that the directors breached their fiduciary duty by distributing
the false press release to inflate artificially the value of the corporation's
shares.7 The court found that the announcement encouraged share-
holders to retain the corporation's stock74 and held that once the directors
voluntarily disclosed information to shareholders, they had to do so fully
and accurately or else they were liable for breach of the fiduciary duty of
disclosure.75 The court also noted that if the shareholders could prove
they suffered damages because of the misdisclosures, they would be
entitled to relief.76 As support for its holding, the Marhart court referred
to a repealed Delaware statute to infer that corporate directors have a
common law disclosure duty when they voluntarily release information
to shareholders but do not seek shareholder action.77 However, the
statute's history suggests that it was merely an antifraud statute that
allowed corporate creditors and investors to sue corporate directors for
70. See id. at 336.
71. Seeid. at 333.
72. See id. at 335. After the announcement, the price of the corporation's stock dropped from $40
to $30. See id.
73. See id. at 333. Plaintiffs claimed that the restructuring plan was actually designed to allow the
tender offeror to dispose of the corporation's stock at a premium rather than to maximize the
corporation's stockholder value as reported in the press release. See id. at 334.
74. See id. at 334.
75. See id. at 336.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 335-36 (citing 21 Del. Laws 273, § 21 (1899), codified at Del. Code Ann. tit. 8,
§ 144 (1953) (repealed 1967)).
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fraudulent written statements regardless of whether a pre-existing
fiduciary relationship existed with the directors.7"
2. The Retreat from Marhart
Despite Marhart's expansive interpretation of the disclosure duty,
subsequent Delaware decisions declined to follow Marhart in imposing
fiduciary liability when directors did not seek shareholder action.79 In
Unimarts, Inc. v. Stein,"0 the court explained the problematic issues
involved in finding fiduciary liability for misrepresentations not con-
nected with a call for shareholder action.8' The court concluded that this
principle would "open state courts under the fiduciary duty rubric to the
regulation of all market transactions... whenever a shareholder traded
after a public announcement" by a corporate fiduciary. 2 Such a "radical
result," the court held, would signal judicial disrespect for the evolved
roles of state corporate law and federal securities regulation. 3 By
refusing to follow Marhart's lead, the Unimarts court prevented overlap
between state and federal causes of action regarding corporate
misdisclosures. The limited application of the disclosure duty stemmed
from the understanding of the different roles played by state law, which
governs issues of internal corporate governance that typically arise when
shareholder action is implicated, and federal securities laws, which focus
on the effect of the disclosure on the national securities markets." Two
of these federal laws brought significant substantive and procedural
changes to state regulation of securities.
78. See Hamermesh, supra note 2, at 1104-06.
79. See Unimarts, Inc. v. Stein, CIV. A. Nos. 14713, 14893, 1996 WL 466961, at *6 (Del. Ch.
Aug. 12, 1996) (holding fiduciary liability for misdisclosure requires material misstatement be made
in connection with request for shareholder action); Bragger v. Budacz, No. 13376, 1994 WL 698609,
at *5 (Del. Ch. Dec. 7, 1994) (dismissing claim that statement was misleading because, among other
things, no shareholder action was sought).
80. Nos. 14713, 14893, 1996 WL 466961 (Del. Ch. Aug. 12, 1996).
81. Seeid. at*6-7.
82. See id. at *7. A sale by a shareholder following a corporate misrepresentation constitutes a
Rule lOb-5 action under federal securities laws. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 228
(1988).
83. Unimarts, 1996 WL466961, at *7.
84. See Id.
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II. CONGRESSIONAL FORAYS INTO SECUPJTIES LITIGATION
REFORM
The federal Private Securities Litigation Reform Act" (Reform Act)
and the federal Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act86 (Uniform
Act) are noteworthy in the context of the fiduciary disclosure duty
because both Acts are primarily designed to create a uniform national
approach to securities litigation.87 The Acts also seek to rectify
commonly perceived problems considered endemic to an entire genre of
litigation-securities fraud class actions, which often turn on allegations
of misrepresentations of financial data.88
A. The Reform Act
The Reform Act was the culmination of an almost five-year effort by
various accounting firms and small, high-tech corporations to curb
private securities litigation. 89 Designed to redress the perceived increase
in frivolous private securities actions," the Reform Act crafted
substantial procedural hurdles to make it more difficult to bring and
maintain a class action in federal court under the Securities Act of 1933
85. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified
in scattered sections in 15 U.S.C.).
86. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998)
(codified in scattered sections in 15 U.S.C.).
87. See S. Rep. No. 105-182, at 3 (1998).
88. See Richard H. Walker & J. Gordon Seymour, Recent Judicial and Legislative Developments
Affecting the Private Securities Fraud Class Action, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 1003, 1023 (1998).
89. See Martha L. Cochran, An Introduction to the Special Securities Litigation Reform Act Issue,
Insights, Jan. 1996, at 2, 2. According to the Reform Act's legislative history, Congress concluded
that abusive practices in securities litigation existed in four areas: (1) the frequent filing of lawsuits
against issuers of securities whenever there was a dramatic change in the issuer's stock price without
consideration of the issuer's culpability, (2) the targeting of defendants with deep pockets without
regard to their culpability, (3) the flagrant abuse of the discovery process designed to impose
burdensome costs on defendants to coerce them to settle, and (4) the class action lawyers'
manipulation of their clients. See id. at 3.
90. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, at 32 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730 ("This
legislation implements needed procedural protections to discourage frivolous litigation.").
Arguments that it was too easy to file securities litigation suggest that Congress also believed there
was too much nonmeritorious litigation. See Private Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs,
103d Cong. 46, 47, 49, 285 (1993) (statements of Dr. Vincent O'Brien, Law and Economic
Consulting Group, and Rep. Tauzin).
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and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.9 The Reform Act also
instituted heightened pleading standards, which require that a plaintiff's
complaint must state with particularity all the facts on which a belief of
securities fraud is based.92 In addition, a plaintiff must state the facts that
give rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the requisite
state of mind.93 These procedural provisions have made it more difficult
for plaintiffs to bring suit under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act,94 the
primary vehicle by which investors can recover their losses due to
directors' false or misleading disclosures.95
The passage of the Reform Act purportedly prompted a shift of much
securities fraud litigation to state courts, mainly as strategic attempts to
evade some of the procedural hurdles now required by federal courts.96
Two phenomena seemed to explain this shift. First, plaintiffs filed
complaints in state court when the underlying facts of their suits did not
meet the stringent federal pleading requirements.97 Second, plaintiffs
resorted to state court litigation to avoid federal discovery stays or to
create state forums for the settlement of other federal claims.98 This
migration to state forums arguably threatened to undermine one of
91. The Reform Act requires mandatory discovery stays while a motion to dismiss the action is
pending. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-l(b), 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (Supp. I1 1997); infra note 96 and
accompanying text. The Reform Act also includes an exception to the discovery limitations that
allows "particularized discovery" if it is "necessary to preserve evidence or to prevent undue
prejudice to [the moving] party." 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-l(b), 78u-4(b)(3)(B). Moreover, the Reform Act
provides a safe harbor for forward-looking statements. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(c)(1)(A)(i), 78u-
5(c)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. III 1997). Under the safe harbor provisions, forward-looking statements are
protected if they are accompanied by cautionary statements that specify certain conditions that can
cause results different.from than those presented in the forward-looking statement. See 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77z-2(c)(1)(B)(i), 78u-5(c)(1)(B)(i) (Supp. mR 1997). However, the statement is not protected if it
can be shown that the statement was made with actual knowledge that it was false or misleading. See
15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(c)(1)(B)(i), 78u-5(c)(1)(B)(i).
92. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (Supp. M 1997).
93. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
95. See Arnold S. Jacobs, The Role of Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 in the Regulation of
Corporate Management, 59 Cornell L. Rev. 27, 28-29 (1973).
96. See Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities Fraud
Causes ofAction, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 273, 307 (1998).
97. See S. Rep. No. 105-182, at 3 (1998).
98. See id.
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Congress' major policy choices in adopting the Reform Act: the
reduction of frivolous securities fraud claims.99
B. The Uniform Act
To ensure that securities fraud litigation would conform to federal
standards established by the Reform Act, Congress passed the Uniform
Standards Act in 1998.00 The Uniform Act preempts state securities
class actions by requiring most of them to be brought solely in federal
court. "' However, the statute preempts only class actions involving fifty
or more plaintiffs 2 and these actions must involve purchases or sales of
securities. 3 The statute does not preempt shareholder derivative
actions," 4 and it preserves state securities class actions if the action
involves any communication made with respect to the sale of securities
that "concerns decisions of those equity holders with respect to voting
their securities, acting in response to tender ... offer[s], or exercising
dissenters' or appraisal rights."'0 5 Proponents of the uniform standards
legislation have acknowledged that the statute does not preempt actions
arising under state corporate law.'0 6 Therefore, claims alleging violation
of Delaware's fiduciary disclosure duty may remain viable state
claims.'07
The Uniform Act and the Reform Act established significant barriers
for shareholders who wish to bring securities actions based on
misdisclosures in state court. However, the Supreme Court of Delaware's
opinion in Malone v. Brincat0 5 left uncertain the precise nature and
99. See Walker & Seymour, supra note 88, at 1022.
100. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
101. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 77p(b) (West Supp. 1999).
102. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 7 7p(f)(2) (West Supp. 1999).
103. The Uniform Act preempts only class actions that allege (1) "an untrue statement or
omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security"; or (2)
"that the defendant used or employed any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security." 15 U.S.C.A. § 77p(b).
104. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 77p(f)(2)(B).
105. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77p(d)(1)(B)(ii)(U) (West Supp. 1999).
106. See Securities Litigation Act: Hearing on S. 1260 Before the Subcomm. on Fin. and
Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Commerce, H.R., 105th Cong. 84-85 (1998)
(testimony of John F. Olson, of Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher).
107. See Walker & Seymour, supra note 88, at 1037.
108. 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998).
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applicability of the fiduciary disclosure duty in the face of these federal
restrictions.
III. MALONE v. BRINCAT
A. Facts
Mercury Finance Company is a publicly traded Delaware corporation
engaged in purchasing installment sales contracts from automobile
dealers and providing short-term installment loans to automobile
purchasers with credit problems."° In 1997, while auditing Mercury's
1996 year-end financial statements, the company's accountants discov-
ered substantial overstatements of Mercury's earnings, its financial
performance, and its shareholders' equity."' As a result, Mercury
Finance announced to its shareholders a substantial reduction in its
unaudited earnings for 1996 as well as its audited annual earnings for
1993-95."' Following the company's announcements of restated
earnings for 1993-96,"' the company's share price declined
dramatically, with a two-billion-dollar drop in the total value of shares.
113
The directors' announcement triggered more than fifty lawsuits in four
jurisdictions, most of which were federal securities fraud actions and
derivative actions brought on Mercury's behalf."4 In Malone, a group of
Mercury shareholders brought a state corporate law action alleging that
the directors breached their fiduciary disclosure duty by making false
disclosures to Mercury shareholders since 19942S In apparently the only
109. See id at 8.
110. Seeid
111. See Malone v. Brincat, No. 15510, 1997 WL 697940, at *1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 30, 1997), rev'd in
part, Malone, 722 A.2d 5.
112. Pursuant to the investigation, Mercury directors announced to the shareholders that the
unaudited earnings for 1996 were only $56.7 million as opposed to the publicly reported $120.7
million: 1995 earnings were only $76.9 million rather than the reported $98.9 million; earnings for
1994 were $83 million rather than the reported $86.5 million; and in 1993, Mercury's earnings were
only $64.2 million in contrast to the reported $64.9 million. At the end of 1996, Mercury's directors
had announced that the shareholders' equity was $353 million when it was actually only $263
million or less. See Malone, 722 A.2d at 8.
113. See Id.
114. See Malone, 1997 WL 697940, at *1.
115. The plaintiffs also brought an aiding-and-abetting claim against Mercury's accountants,
KPMG Peat Marwick, LLP, for knowingly participating in the directors' breaches of their fiduciary
disclosure duties. See id. The court of chancery summarily dismissed the aiding-and-abetting claim
because of the plaintiffs' failure to show the directors' breach of their fiduciary disclosure duties. See
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action of its kind, the plaintiffs in Malone brought suit in Delaware state
court individually and on behalf of all persons who owned Mercury
common stock from 1993 through 1997, alleging that Mercury directors
had breached the fiduciary duty of disclosure." 6 The plaintiffs did not
assert any claims for remedy."7
B. Procedural History
The court of chancery held that the directors had no fiduciary
disclosure duty in the absence of a request for shareholder action." 8 The
chancellor characterized the corporation's restatement of its earnings as
an attempt to comply with federal disclosure laws, independent from the
"shareholder decisional process affecting corporate governance" of the
type normally governed by state corporate law.' 9 Timely and accurate
disclosures of financial information into the marketplace, the court noted,
are governed by federal law, and if shareholders are injured as a result of
the release of false information "unconnected with any Delaware
corporate governance issue, that shareholder must seek a remedy under
federal law."' 20 The court held that to recognize a fiduciary disclosure
duty in this context would be to "duplicate[] or impliedly usurp[]"
federal remedies under the securities laws.'
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed in part and
reversed in part. It held that corporate fiduciaries may be liable for
making corporate misrepresentations even in the absence of a call for
shareholder action."z Although the court upheld the court of chancery's
dismissal of the case, it further held that the dismissal should have been
id. at *3. Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Delaware upheld the lower court's dismissal based on
the plaintiffs' absence of a well-pleaded allegation stating a derivative, class, or individual cause of
action and properly assertable remedy. See Malone, 722 A.2d at 14-15. Because the focus of this
Note is on the corporate directors, a determination of the validity of the dismissal of plaintiffs'
allegation against the accountants will not be discussed.
116. See Malone, 1997 WL 697940, at * 1.
117. See Malone, 722 A.2d at 14.
118. See Malone, 1997 WL 697940, at *2-3.
119. Id. at *2.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See Malone, 722 A.2d at 10.
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without prejudice." The court permitted the shareholders to amend their
complaint into either a direct or derivative action and allowed them to
assert any damages or equitable remedies for their claim. 4
C. Analysis by the Supreme Court ofDelaware
In a surprisingly short en banc decision, the Supreme Court of
Delaware held that false disclosures of financial information by
corporate directors may constitute the basis for a direct or derivative
cause of action under Delaware law, even if the alleged misrepre-
sentations were not made in connection with a request for shareholder
action. 5 The court concluded that when directors disseminate
information to shareholders in this context, the fiduciary duties of care,
loyalty, and good faith still apply; therefore, false or misleading
disclosures can violate one or more of those duties. 26 Although it agreed
that the complaint as drafted should have been dismissed, the court
allowed plaintiffs the option to replead and assert either a direct or a
derivative action against the directors. 27
Recognizing that federal disclosure regulations are the principal
mechanisms for policing the disclosure of information into the general
interstate market, the court acknowledged that there is "no legitimate
basis to create a new [state] cause of action which would replicate.., the
provisions of... the 1934 Act."'28 Nevertheless, the court observed that
because the shareholders did not sell or purchase securities on the
market, their claim did not implicate federal securities laws.'29 The court
found that the Uniform Act did not preempt the shareholders' case
because they brought their suit before Congress enacted the Act. The
court noted, however, that even if the action had been brought after
enactment and the statute was applicable, the statute could not preempt
the shareholders' claim because the claim fell under one of the statute's
exemptions from preemption.'30
123. See id. at 15.
124. See id at 14-15.
125. See id at 10.
126. See id at 12.
127. See id. at 14.
128. Id. at 13 (quoting Arnold v. Society for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 678 A.2d 533, 539 (Del. 1996)).
129. See id.
130. See id. ("[Delaware] law already provide[d] that corporate directors have fiduciary disclosure
obligations to shareholders"); see also 15 U.S.C.A. § 77p(d)(1)(B)(ii)(1) (West Supp. 1999).
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IV. MALONE v. BRINCAT RENDERS THE FIDUCIARY
DISCLOSURE DUTY UNCLEAR
In Malone v. Brincat, the Supreme Court of Delaware significantly
expanded the fiduciary disclosure duty of corporate directors under
Delaware law without providing sufficient guidance as to the scope of
the duty's application. In the progression of Delaware cases setting forth
the duties of corporate directors under state law, Malone is confusing
because it fails to define clearly the nature of the cause of action by
which directors may now be liable for violating the fiduciary disclosure
duty. Moreover, the court's grant of a direct action was inappropriate
because the proper vehicle for litigation in this case should have been a
derivative action. By allowing a direct action in the absence of
shareholder action, the court also blurred the boundaries between state
and federal actions concerning corporate disclosure. The potential
application of Delaware's fiduciary laws in a securities fraud context
where federal laws were designed to operate may undermine the
congressional objective of limiting litigation of securities fraud class
actions to federal courts. Malone may then lead to extensive forum abuse
by defrauded shareholders who will want to bring their suits in Delaware
state court to avoid the rigid procedural requirements of federal courts. 3,
Given these results, Malone convolutes, rather than clarifies, corporate
directors' fiduciary disclosure obligations under Delaware law.
A. The Court Failed to Define Adequately the New Disclosure Duty
In Malone, the Supreme Court of Delaware failed to articulate, beyond
vague incantations of fiduciary duties, what principles supported the
expansion of the disclosure duty. The court neither sufficiently explained
the reasons behind its expansion nor provided the principal basis for
distinguishing Malone from previous authorities regarding the
application of the disclosure duty. The Malone court mentioned that the
fiduciary duties of "care, loyalty and good faith" apply when directors
disseminate information to shareholders; 32 however, it did not specify
whether one or all of these fiduciary obligations apply in such a situation.
Having asserted only general fiduciary rhetoric, the opinion created a
disclosure duty without a clear articulation of principle.
131. See infra Part IV.E.
132. Malone, 722 A.2d at 12.
1170
Vol. 74:1151, 1999
Fiduciary Disclosure Duty
Under settled Delaware law, fiduciary principles operate when
directors' misconduct accompanies a solicitation of shareholder action
that impacts shareholder rights and responsibilities within a corporation.
Therefore, fiduciary principles apply when corporate misstatements
affect internal corporate governance issues.'33 For example, Stroud and
Lynch v. Vickers' involved situations where the fiduciary disclosure
duties arose out of directorial conduct that implicated shareholder
action.'35 In Malone, the Supreme Court of Delaware cited to cases such
as Lynch and Stroud to support its expansion of the disclosure duty, yet
these cases are factually distinguishable from Malone. The directors in
Malone did not release Mercury's financial statements in conjunction
with a request for shareholder action.'36 In fact, the dissemination of
those statements suggests only that Mercury attempted to comply with
various federal securities regulations that mandate periodic reporting
requirements from certain corporations. When directors release
information to the public, independent of a call for shareholder action,
past Delaware cases suggest that no fiduciary relation is involved;
therefore, no fiduciary duties are implicated.'37 Despite the factual
dissimilarities between Malone and the other disclosure duty cases, the
court neither acknowledged nor attempted to resolve these incongruities.
In addition, the court's reference to Marhart as legal support and
justification for the expansion of the fiduciary disclosure duty is suspect
in light of Marhart's reliance on a repealed statute that now plays no part
in the fiduciary context.' A director's liability under the law relied on in
Marhart did not depend specifically on the existence of a fiduciary
relation between the injured creditor or investor and the director.
Therefore, the Supreme Court of Delaware's reliance on Marhart to
expand the disclosure duty was inappropriate.
133. See supra Part L
134. 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1977).
135. In Lynch, the Supreme Court of Delaware held that the majority shareholders, when
purchasing stock from minority shareholders, had a fiduciary duty to disclose all information
regarding the stock purchase. See id. at 281. The court also found the directors liable for being
complicit in the majority shareholders' breach of the disclosure duty. See id, at 279, 281. Similarly,
Stroud involved the disclosure duty in the context of the shareholders' vote of certain by-law and
charter amendments. See Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 75 (Del. 1992).
136. See Malone, 722 A.2d at 9.
137. See supra note 79.
138. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
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The Malone court missed the opportunity to explain its finding of
fiduciary liability when it declined without explanation to follow the
lower court decisions that explicitly refused to find fiduciary liability for
misrepresentations made in the absence of shareholder action.'39 When
the court decided Malone, it had before it the chancery decision in
Unimarts, which held that if the contested transaction did not require
shareholder approval or action, Delaware law simply had no application
to the alleged misstatements. 140 The court in Unimarts recognized that an
expansion of state fiduciary laws could potentially intrude upon the
effectiveness of federal protections available to investors in the purchase
or sale of securities.'14 Unimarts raised a legitimate concern because an
imposition of fiduciary liability in the absence of shareholder action
burdens state courts with the responsibility of regulating all market
transactions that involve shareholder trading based on corporate
communications. 42 The application of fiduciary laws in the absence of
shareholder action also disturbs the balance between state law, which
governs internal corporate affairs, and federal law, which regulates
transactions on the securities markets. 43 Despite this concern, the
Malone court avoided discussing the issue altogether. The court's failure
to explain why it rejected previous lower court decisions rendered
unclear the scope of the new fiduciary disclosure duty.
B. The Court Erroneously Permitted a Direct Action
By allowing shareholders to bring a direct action, the court confused
the proper cause of action required to challenge directors' breaches of the
disclosure duty. Because the misdisclosures in Malone were not
connected with an exercise of any shareholder rights, there was no
breach of a duty owed directly to the shareholders and therefore no
139. See supra note 79.
140. See Unimarts v. Stein, Nos. 14713, 14893, 1996 WL 466961, at *6 (Del. Ch. Aug. 12, 1996).
141. See supra note 81.
142. See Unimarts, 1996 WL 466961, at *7.
143. Federal securities laws require accurate disclosure regarding a corporation's business so that
investors have the information necessary to make informed decisions about their investments on the
market. See Arthur Fleischer, Jr., "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 Harv. L. Rev.
1146,1148 (1965).
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justification for a direct action. In Delaware, most direct shareholder
actions have involved suits where directorial misconduct affected some
kind of shareholder right, such as the right to vote in a transaction.'"
Much of the discussion regarding the fiduciary duties that directors owe
directly to shareholders has been based on the shareholders' franchise
rationale 4' or even ordinary tort concepts.'" The fiduciary duty raised in
Malone did not arise out of either of these circumstances. On the
contrary, the directors' misstatements in Malone were not associated
with a transaction that implicated any shareholder rights. Instead, the
release of the company's financial records was an attempt to comply
with the annual reporting requirements of the federal securities laws. 47
In sum, a direct action in Malone was improper because the directors did
not owe a disclosure duty directly to the shareholders when releasing
information in accordance with federal regulations.
Furthermore, a direct action was inappropriate given that Malone
involved a situation traditionally redressed by shareholder derivative
actions. Mercury's false financial reports resulted in a decrease in the
value of the corporation's stock, a corporate injury that Delaware courts
have identified as a proper basis for a derivative action. 4 In Malone, a
direct action could not have remedied the shareholders' claim because
the shareholders were able to show only an overall corporate injury,
making calculation of individual shareholder damages speculative at
best. Although Delaware courts have previously granted monetary relief
in suits alleging directors' breach of the disclosure duty,'4 9 shareholders
in those cases provided sufficient proof of individual damages to support
their damages claim.50 Given the propriety of a derivative suit, the court
should not have granted a direct action.
144. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
145. According to this rationale, shareholder action necessarily affects fundamental shareholder
rights in stock ownership; therefore, corporate directors have fiduciary obligations when directorial
conduct affects any rights incident to share ownership. See supra Part LA.
146. Directors are directly liable to shareholders for their tortious misconduct. See Gaffin v.
Teledyne, Inc., 611 A.2d 467, 472 (Del. 1992) (discussing equitable fraud as basis of liability for
material omissions in corporation's offer to purchase its own outstanding shares).
147. See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 8 (Del. 1998); 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1994).
148. See supra note 49.
149. See supra Part LC.
150. See supra notes 56, 60, and accompanying text.
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C. Malone Obscured the Elements of the Cause ofAction by Which
Directors May Be Liable for Violating the Disclosure Duty
Assuming that a disclosure duty exists even in the absence of share-
holder action, the Supreme Court of Delaware did not clearly indicate to
whom the duty is owed, what standard of culpability applies, or what
measure of relief is available to those injured by corporate directors'
misrepresentations. Although the court initially noted that the directors
owed the disclosure duty to the shareholders,15" ' it later stated that the
particular plaintiffs in Malone were not purchasers or sellers of
securities, but merely holders of stock.15 Therefore, it is unclear whether
the cause of action is available only to those shareholders who did not
trade, or whether buyers and sellers of securities who relied on the
misrepresentations are also entitled to bring this cause of action.
Furthermore, the opinion did not establish what standard of culpability is
required in an action alleging a breach of the disclosure duty. The court
did state that a violation of the fiduciary duty existed when directors
"deliberately misinform[ed]" shareholders with false or misleading
financial information. 53 However, it is unclear whether simple negli-
gence meets the culpability requirement. Finally, the court failed to
address what kinds of relief are available for plaintiffs who prevail in this
type of action. The court merely allowed the shareholders to replead and
assert any damages claim."s Without a clear articulation of the elements
of the cause of action that shareholders can bring against directors for
corporate misdisclosures, the nature and applicability of the new
disclosure duty remains uncertain, particularly in the face of federal
securities laws.
D. Malone Inappropriately Creates a State Equivalent of a Federal
Securities Claim
Malone interferes with the purpose of a dual system of securities
regulation by leaving open the possibility that Delaware's fiduciary laws
may apply in situations already governed by federal securities laws.
Comprehensive federal regulation of securities works to ensure full and
151. See Malone, 722 A.2d at 10 ("The directors' fiduciary duties include the duty to deal with
their stockholders honestly.").
152. See id. at 13.
153. Id. at 14.
154. See id.
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accurate disclosures regarding a corporation's business so that investors
may have the information necessary to make informed investment
decisions.' By contrast, Delaware fiduciary laws govern the relationship
and rights of directors and shareholders within a corporation.'56 If certain
disclosures are made independent of a request for shareholders to
exercise their rights, no fiduciary issues arise and Delaware's fiduciary
laws should not apply. Although the Supreme Court of Delaware noted
that Mercury's shareholders could not invoke the federal securities laws
because they neither bought nor sold securities in reliance on the false
reports," 7 nothing in the court's statement of the new disclosure duty
explicitly limited its application to circumstances where shareholders
have no federal recourse. Therefore, the new disclosure duty applies even
when directors make misstatements in the course of complying with
federal securities regulations. The court's failure to limit the application
of the new disclosure duty blurs the boundaries between state and federal
actions concerning corporate misrepresentations.
Even if Malone is designed to provide a remedy for misdisclosures
only when the federal securities laws do not, the mere fact that the court
found the directors liable for breach of the fiduciary duty for purposes of
Delaware corporate law does not mean that Malone is not, at heart, a
federal securities case. The misstatements in Malone occurred in the
annual reports compiled by Mercury pursuant to section 13 of the
Exchange Act.'58 Shareholders injured by misleading statements in such
reports can pursue federal remedies under section 18 of the Exchange
Act. By allowing an action under Delaware fiduciary laws in this
situation, the Supreme Court of Delaware created a state cause of action
for what was essentially a federal securities claim. Creation of such a
cause of action undermines recent congressional attempts to restrict
securities fraud litigation exclusively to federal courts.
E. Malone Undermines the Objectives of the Federal Reform Act
The blurring of boundaries between state and federal disclosure laws
may induce plaintiffs, who might otherwise pursue adequate federal
155. See supra note 143.
156. See supra note I 1 and accompanying text.
157. Under Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731 (1975), only purchasers
or buyers of securities have standing to bring a 1Ob-5 action in federal court to challenge inadequate
or false disclosures in connections with share transactions.
158. See Malone, 722 A.2d at 8.
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remedies, to bring their cases under state law to avoid the stringent
federal procedural requirements. Congress has declared such conduct to
be an impermissibly abusive device.'59 Despite the potential for forum
shopping, the Malone court failed to address how it would prevent such
abuse.
The fundamental changes in the securities class action landscape
brought by the Reform Act conflict with the desire of defrauded
shareholders to bring their breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims to Delaware
state court and to take advantage of Delaware corporate law's attractive
avenues of recovery. The lack of clearly defined boundaries to
Delaware's fiduciary laws brought about by Malone implies that these
laws can apply concurrently with federal laws regarding corporate
disclosure. It is not difficult to imagine a group of shareholders, who
might otherwise file federal actions alleging that they relied on a
corporation's Form 10-K in deciding to buy or sell their shares,"6° instead
bringing their actions under Delaware law to avoid the complex
procedural requirements of the federal Reform Act. Seen in this light, the
Malone court may have inappropriately provided plaintiffs with
incentives to pursue a state law forum for securities fraud claims that
should otherwise be brought in federal court under federal law.
Plaintiffs will have several other reasons to bring an action under
Delaware law. First, they may take advantage of Delaware's attractive
avenues of recovery for defrauded shareholders. For example, Delaware
corporate law provides greater potential for recovery than Rule 1Ob-5. 6'
Under Delaware law, plaintiffs have a number of available remedies
including injunctive relief, rescission of the transaction, or rescissory
damages. 62 By contrast, under federal law, plaintiffs can recover
monetary damages only if the misrepresentations inflated or deflated the
stock price at the time of plaintiffs' purchase or sale of the securities. 63
159. See S. Rep. No. 105-182, at 3 (1998); see also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-803, at 1 (1998).
160. Form 10-K is an annual report that provides a comprehensive overview of a company's
business and must be filed within 90 days of the end of a company's fiscal year. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(a)(2) (1994).
161. See Jay W. Eisenhofer & Megan D. McIntyre, Causes ofAction Available to Investors Under
Delaware Law in the Wake of Federal Securities Reform: Part II, Insights, Nov. 1996, at 2, 4. Rule
lOb-5, promulgated under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, is the most well-known
antifraud provision of the federal securities laws. Section 10(b) is the primary vehicle by which
investors attempt to recover their losses due to a director's false or misleading disclosures.
162. See id.
163. Rule 10b-5, promulgated under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, protects
only buyers and sellers of securities and creates an implied private right of action, which
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In Delaware, plaintiffs do not have to show actual reliance on the
misstatement" and may obtain monetary damages without proving
actual loss. 65 Second, Delaware law interprets the fiduciary disclosure
duty strictly and directors can incur liability without regard to their
negligence or other culpability." By contrast, liability under Rule lOb-5
will not lie without a showing of scienter 67 Now that plaintiffs may be
able to file securities fraud claims under state law in state court, the
Supreme Court of Delaware should have outlined, if not implemented,
procedural requirements analogous to those mandated by the Reform Act
to prevent such forum abuse.
F. Malone Renders Unclear the Operational Effects of the Federal
Uniform Act
The Supreme Court of Delaware's finding of fiduciary liability in the
absence of a request for shareholder action makes it difficult to
determine how the preemptive effect of the Uniform Act applies to state
fiduciary duty suits. First, if state fiduciary laws apply and state courts
are available even when plaintiffs buy or sell securities and therefore
have federal claims, 6' there is a conflict with the Uniform Act's explicit
shareholders can use to challenge inadequate or fraudulent disclosures in connection with share
transactions. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998).
164. See In re Ti-Star Pictures, Inc., Litig., 634 A.2d 319, 327 n.10 (Del. 1993) (citing Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985)).
165. See Tri-Star, 634 A.2d at 333. However, monetary damages may be excluded in the
corporation's certificate of incorporation, but only if the misstatement or omission was a good faith
error. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1998); see also Arnold v. Society for Say. Bancorp,
Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1286-88 (Del. 1994).
166. None of the following cases indicate that only a culpable failure to disclose will constitute a
breach of the disclosure duty:
In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. Shareholder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 66 (Del. 1995); Arnold, 650 A.2d at
1277; Zirn v. VLI Corp., 621 A.2d 773, 778 (Del. 1993); Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del.
1992); Shell Petroleum, Inc. v. Smith, 606 A.2d 112, 114-15 (Del. 1992); Barkan v. Amsted Indus.,
Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1288 (Del. 1989); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 890 (Del. 1985);
Lewis v. Leaseway Transp. Corp., 1990 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,275, at 96,268 (Del. Ch. May
16, 1990); Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 n.2 (Del. Ch. 1988).
167. The term "scienter" as applied to the conduct necessary to give rise to an action for civil
damages under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lob-5 refers to the mental state
embracing an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. See Black's Law Dictionary 1345 (6th ed.
1990). In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976), the Court held that scienter was a
necessary element of a Rule l Ob-5 damage action. The Court also held that scienter was required in
an injunctive action.
168. See supra Part V.C.
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preemption of those actions where shareholders buy or sell securities as a
result of corporate misrepresentations.'69 Second, even assuming that the
Malone court did not intend to contradict the terms of the Uniform Act,
the court provided an inaccurate explanation of why the statute did not
apply to the plaintiffs' case.70 Read literally, the Uniform Act does not
apply to actions where plaintiffs did not purchase or sell securities but
merely retained them in reliance on the corporate misrepresentations. 7 '
Because the plaintiffs in Malone did not buy or sell securities, their claim
could likely be heard in state court.
Instead of relying on this fact to explain its decision to provide
plaintiffs with a state forum, the court turned to and incorrectly
interpreted a provision of the Uniform Act that preserved the availability
of certain state actions.'72 In this provision, the interplay between the
Uniform Act and Delaware's state fiduciary laws is clear. 73 The Uniform
Act does not preempt an action brought under state law if the challenged
misrepresentations, made in connection with the sale of securities,
solicited shareholder action or called for the exercise of shareholder
rights such as voting, acting in response to a tender offer, or exercising
appraisal rights.7 If there was no shareholder action, the claims must be
brought under federal law. 7 Despite this clearly written provision, the
Malone court determined that the existence of state fiduciary disclosure
laws, not the existence of shareholder action, provides plaintiffs with a
state law forum.'76 This conclusion is inconsistent with the unambiguous
language of the Uniform Act. The Act's distinction between communi-
cations that do and do not solicit shareholder action indicates that viable
state claims involve internal corporate governance issues. By contrast,
the absence of shareholder action in Malone indicates that there were no
169. See supra note 103.
170. The Uniform Act did not apply to the shareholders in Malone because they brought their suit
before Congress enacted the statute and the statute does not affect or apply to any action commenced
before and pending on the date of its enactment. See Pub. L. No. 105-353, § 101(c), 112 Stat. 3227,
3233 (1998). However, the statute's preemption of certain state fiduciary suits and the preemption's
effect on the scope of Delaware state fiduciary laws are important issues that merit a discussion in
this Note and deserved discussion in the court's opinion.
171. See supra note 103.
172. See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 13 (Del. 1998).
173. See supra note 105.
174. See supra note 105.
175. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 77p(b) (West Supp. 1999).
176. See Malone, 722 A.2d at 13.
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internal governance matters at issue. Therefore, the court should not have
relied on this provision to hold that a state forum was available for the
plaintiffs' claim. The court's flawed interpretation of the Uniform Act
will undoubtedly create problems in future cases dealing with the
applicability of the federal preemption statute in fiduciary duty suits.
V. CONCLUSION
Malone v. Brincat presented an excellent opportunity for the Supreme
Court of Delaware to clarify the fiduciary disclosure doctrine and the
relationship between state and federal securities laws. Had the court
supplied an explanation for its departure from precedent and correctly
stated the cause of action required to challenge the directors' breach of
the disclosure duty, Malone would have transformed the disclosure duty
under Delaware law into a formidable state fiduciary doctrine. Instead,
the court expanded the corporate directors' disclosure duty without
providing sufficient guidance as to the scope of its application.
Furthermore, Malone produces substantial uncertainty as to the
application of Delaware fiduciary laws in the face of recent federal
restrictions on securities fraud litigation.
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